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The concept of covenantal pluralism suggests a pattern of interaction between citizens with different beliefs and worldviews in the public realm without the necessity of suppressing their religious identity. In my recent article in The Review of Faith & International Affairs on the prospects for covenantal pluralism in Bulgaria, I discussed such factors as the religious diversity in this country, the historical experience of Bulgarians in inter-faith communication, and the post-communist developments in the spheres of law, politics, and society. By outlining critical aspects of the culture of religious tolerance of contemporary Bulgarian citizens, this approach highlights specific challenges that covenantal pluralism might face in Bulgaria.

In particular, the article reveals that religious diversity and a culture of religious tolerance are subjects of centuries-old evolution encompassing different models of treatment of the local faith communities under different political, religious, and legal systems (e.g., Christian Medieval Bulgarian Kingdoms, the Muslim Ottoman Empire, the national Bulgarian state dominated by Eastern Orthodoxy, the atheist Bulgarian state, and post-communist secular Bulgaria). Besides, the above-mentioned approach considers changes in the religious landscape. For example, the fourteenth-century Ottoman invasion had a dual effect on Bulgarian society. While ruining the medieval monopoly of Eastern Orthodox Christianity (also known as Eastern Orthodoxy or simply as Orthodoxy), it stimulated the development of previously unknown forms of interfaith communication. During the five centuries of Ottoman rule, Orthodox Bulgarians learned to coexist as a religious minority and to communicate not only with Muslims, representing the dominant religion in the Ottoman Empire, but also with other faith minorities like Jews and Armenians.  At the same time, the establishment of their nation-state in 1878 did not erase the old patterns of interfaith communication but adapted them to the new conditions: now Orthodox Bulgarians represented the dominant religion in the country, while Muslims obtained a minority status.

In a similar manner, the next political changes linked with the atheist rule of communists and the post-1989 Bulgarian democratic state introduced their own patterns of dealing with religious diversity, thus leaving their imprints on contemporary religious demography of the country. In parallel, each one of these forms of government employed specific policies in the religious sphere, which were determined by various models of legislation. Some of them were religiously motivated (e.g. in Medieval Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire), while others took shape under the influence of modern law and ideologies like Marxism-Leninism, secularism, nationalism, liberal democracy, etc.

Furthermore, while pluralism appeared in the life of Orthodox Bulgarians upon the Ottoman invasion of their lands, its perception and related practices at the level of everyday life and state religious policies varied in the course of time. Correspondingly, the impact of pluralism on social life of the inhabitants of the present territory of Bulgaria evolved as well.  In addition, the developed pluralism-related practices are characterized by certain selectiveness. In the age of nationalism, the Bulgarian Orthodox majority showed intolerance to those ethnic Bulgarians who for various reasons adopted different faiths. The main targets of this intolerance became the Pomaks (i.e., ethnic Bulgarians who converted to Islam over the centuries of Ottoman rule) and often the Eastern Greek Catholics (i.e., ethnic Bulgarians who entered into union with the Roman Pope in 1860). The former were accused of practicing a “Turkish faith,” the latter of being more loyal to the Roman Pope than to their nation-state. Meanwhile, during the Second World War, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church played a key role in the rescuing of the local Jews from extradition to the Nazi extermination camps. Though diminishing in the process of post-communist democratization of the country, this ethno-religious dimension of religious (in)tolerance continues to influence the attitude of some Bulgarians toward specific religious minorities even today.

Its influence can be traced in the disposition of mainline politicians to associate Bulgarianness with Eastern Orthodoxy. Therefore, the post-communist Bulgarian state shows a special benevolence to the local Orthodox Church. Despite the 1998 judgment of the Constitutional Court defining the traditional character of Eastern Orthodoxy as one that expresses the historical role of this religion “and its significance for the Bulgarian state, as well as its present meaning for the state life, which is mostly reflected in the system of official holidays (all Sundays, New Year, Easter, Christmas),” the state and municipal authorities are inclined to give priority to the Bulgarian patriarchate as the representative of this religious tradition in the country. As a result, the legal recognition of most religious minorities is not coupled with the same political and administrative recognition as that received by the local patriarchal Orthodox Church.

The trend is well demonstrated by the case of the Bulgarian Old Calendar Church. Since 2009, its attempts to receive legal registration have been systematically declined by Bulgarian courts insisting that the registration of a new Orthodox church required the approval of the patriarchal Bulgarian Orthodox Church. These decisions were motivated by a reference to the Religious Denomination Act of 2002 ex lege recognizing the patriarchal body as the legal entity representing Eastern Orthodoxy in the country. On 16 December 2024, however, the commented approach was denounced by the Supreme Court of Cassation as one that contradicted the exposition of the European Court of Human Rights about the positive duty of the Bulgarian state to neutrally exercise its regulatory tasks regarding different religions in the country as a warrant of religious pluralism. This act was immediately condemned by the Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church. On January 3, 2025, Patriarch Daniil expressed the Church’s strong disagreement before President Rumen Radev of the Republic of Bulgaria and received his support. The latter responded that the risks faced by the patriarchal Orthodox Church should be considered as threats to national unity and sovereignty.

In parallel, key political parties represented in the National Parliament submitted draft laws for the amendment of the Religious Denominations Act. It took them only a few weeks to put aside their political disagreements and to discuss and vote an amendment guaranteeing the monopoly of the patriarchal Bulgarian Orthodox Church to use the adjective “Orthodox” [pravoslavna] in its institutional name. In addition, the amended law obliged already registered denominations whose names contained the adjective “Orthodox,” as well as those who were in a process of registration, to change their names accordingly. The failure to do so automatically deprived such denominations of their status of legal entity or made them ineligible for court registration.

In this regard, the reaction of the head of the Armenian Apostolic Orthodox Holy Church in Bulgaria, Bishop Datev Agopyan, deserves special attention as it points to the international complications that might arise from the discussed legal change. On the eve of the final voting of the amendment, he issued a special declaration addressed to His Holiness Bulgarian Patriarch Daniil and to the Chairman of the Bulgarian National Parliament. The Bishop pointed out that this document was issued with the blessing of His Holiness Catholicos Karekin II – the All-Armenian Patriarch and stated that the Armenian Eparchy in Bulgaria supports the forthcoming change and the legal statute of the local Orthodox Church. Finally, he explicitly declared that his Armenian Eparchy does not pretend to represent the traditional religion in Bulgaria as it is stipulated in the Bulgarian Constitution and defined as its sole representative by the Religious Denominations Act. In this way, the adjective “Orthodox” was preserved in the official name of his Eparchy as it is seen from its website.

What the above analysis and examples suggest, in short, is that the adoption of covenantal pluralism seems to depend not only on domestic circumstances (e.g., the local religious diversity, historical patterns of religious (in)tolerance, the specific forms of legislation and political rule), but also on relations which the local religious communities have with the leaderships of the same faith or heterodox religious denominations abroad.