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In 2024, Vladimir Putin maintained that religious diversity is a “strength,” recounting the numerous historical moments when Muslims, Buddhists, and many other religious groups were integrated into Russia. From this perspective, religious pluralism is seen as hardwired into Russia’s “cultural code” and national identity. Accordingly, the country celebrates its multi-ethnic and multi-confessional identity through national holidays that emphasize cross-cultural and inter-religious solidarity. The Constitution provides broad protection for religious freedom and practices.

Yet behind this official rhetoric and policies, the reality of religious freedom in Russia tells a more complicated story—a story analyzed in great detail in a recent article in The Review of Faith & International Affairs. Building on fieldwork and interviews with religious communities in Russia, we explore how these groups experience religious freedom and consider the prospects of covenantal pluralism in Russia today. To forefront the findings, we show a stark mismatch between legal protections and the lived experiences of religious communities, especially minority faiths. We demonstrate that religious freedoms are uneven, and it is often difficult for religious communities to find common ground and cultivate relationships of mutual understanding with one another. In short, the prospects of covenantal pluralism in contemporary Russia are limited.

At the heart of the problem lies a deeply ingrained religious hierarchy that informally divides faiths into traditional and non-traditional religions. The Russian Orthodox Church is undoubtedly at the top of this hierarchy, with its “special role” in the country’s historical, spiritual, and cultural development, granting it privileged access to political decision-makers and government resources unlike other religious communities. It is often assumed that to be Russian is to be Orthodox Christian, and Orthodox Christianity is commonly depicted as the cornerstone of traditional Russian values and cultural identity. These same traditional values are also used to advance Putin’s domestic and foreign policies. Below Orthodox Christianity on the religious hierarchy are Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism, which are acknowledged as traditional religions due to their historical role in Russia. However, these faiths do not possess a “special status” like the Orthodox Church, nor do they share the same close relations with the Kremlin. Other religious groups, such as Christian minorities (Evangelicals, Baptists, Charismatics, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Pentecostals), tend to fall at the lower end of the hierarchy and are, in turn, treated with suspicion and labeled as religious newcomers, not rooted in Russia.

This hierarchy is not only symbolic, but also fundamentally undermines Russia’s prospects for covenantal pluralism—a vision of diverse societies grounded not just in legal equality but in mutual respect, neighborly solidarity, and reciprocal commitment across difference. The hierarchy between traditional and non-traditional religions creates an uneven playing field that reinforces two forms of inequality:

• Legal inequity, where traditional religions tend to have greater policy influence and access to state resources, while non-traditional religions face greater government restrictions and scrutiny;
• Political favoritism, where traditional faiths are seen as patriotic and loyal to the state, and non-traditional religions are depicted by state and societal actors as foreign faiths, sects, potential sources of extremism, and threats to Russian society and culture.

Drawing on semi-structured interviews with religious leaders from traditional and non-traditional faiths and scholars in cities across Russia, we show how top-down laws and policies create a two-tiered system that fosters inequity and politicizes religious life, especially for religious minorities. Many respondents reflected on the uneven nature of religious freedom across the country. While most maintained that religious freedom is certainly more protected than during the Soviet era, the informal religious hierarchy has important implications. Religious freedom for non-traditional faiths is often treated as conditional—that is, dependent on the local government officials’ attitudes toward minority faiths, the influence and leadership of the local Orthodox Church, and the openness of the local population. As one respondent remarked, “In different regions, there is a ‘little Tsar,’ and depending on their attitude towards certain religious organizations, they are treated differently.”

What was palpable on the ground is the differences between the officially recognized traditional religions and those labeled as “sects,” with the latter burdened with financial and bureaucratic hurdles and routinely discriminated against. For example, some Christian minorities were acutely aware of their ties or perceived ties to external churches, especially to churches in Ukraine. Church leaders explained that in the current political climate, ties to Ukraine are political liabilities, pre-empting some to sever relations and discontinue cross-border collaboration. Failure to do so, some speculated, would mean increased political scrutiny of their churches and reinforce the assumption that they are foreign faiths and unpatriotic. One scholar commented on the precarious political situation for Christian minorities, suggesting that they “risk being seen as undermining the Pravoslav [Orthodox] faith in Russia and almost immediately become associated with espionage.”

Clergy from non-traditional religions also discussed the cultural challenges of living under the shadow of the Orthodox Church. Christian minority leaders, for instance, frequently commented that “Russia is an Orthodox country” or the “Russian Orthodox Church is dominant,” reflecting on the close and mutually beneficial relationship between the Kremlin and the Russian Orthodox Church. Church leaders were also careful to explain that their minority churches were not competing with Orthodox Christianity, nor should their churches be considered threats to Russian culture. Nevertheless, many described the everyday challenges of Orthodox cultural dominance and how this fostered suspicion of Christian minorities. Others noted that the religious hierarchy has turned religious communities against one another. As a result, churches are careful to position themselves as rooted Russian organizations and showcase their patriotism. In other words, non-traditional religions must openly and actively display their patriotism or risk social and political exclusion.

All of this suggests the uneven and political nature of religious freedom in contemporary Russia. Being labeled as non-traditional or foreign carries a cultural and political stigma and indicates how deeply the traditional versus non-traditional divide permeates society, undermining the prospects for covenantal pluralism. Russia, therefore, serves as a sobering reminder that covenantal pluralism is far more than a matter of legal protections; it encompasses the lived experiences of faith-based communities and how they navigate political and social forces. For covenantal pluralism to take hold, Russia must embrace not only a cultural commitment to religious inclusivity, solidarity, and diversity, celebrated in legal documents and during national holidays, but also a practiced and respected commitment at the bytovoj uroven, or “everyday level.”