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Despite relatively high levels of religious literacy and constitutional provisions for religious freedom, the prospects for covenantal pluralism in Zimbabwe are at present very limited. Many churches and church councils are deeply divided by denomination, theology, and ethnicity. As I argued in a recent article in The Review of Faith & International Affairs, these divisions have roots in the colonial era and were intensified during the nationalist struggle, 1965-80. Since independence in 1980 they have been exacerbated by the ruling party, ZANU/PF, which has used its moral authority to define liberation and castigate churches and other elements of civil society that did not share its narrowly defined notions of unity or its program of modernizing development.

British imperial commitment to religious liberty in the colonial era, 1890-1980, meant that many missionary societies, unable to sustain a territory-wide presence, created a patchwork quilt of regional or local Christianities around mission stations. These differences were institutionalized by the Southern Rhodesia Missionary Council founded in 1903. During the nationalist struggle, particularly the guerrilla war, 1976-80, cleavages emerged between white urban churches and rural black churches. Whereas the Catholic Church, particularly its Commission for Justice and Peace (CJP), sided with African nationalism, leading white Anglicans shared Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith’s belief that he was defending Christian civilization against atheistic communism. A considerable rift opened between the World Council of Churches which supported nationalist guerrillas through its Program to Combat Racism (1969), and the Rhodesian Council of Churches (RCC) which, under the leadership of the moderate nationalist, Bishop Abel Muzorewa, went into government with Smith’s Rhodesian Front.

During the nationalist era African nationalism had grown increasingly violent and intolerant, and this trajectory continued after ZANU/PF assumed power in 1980. The immediate fate of the churches and church councils hinged on their wartime stance towards the liberation movements. But they would increasingly be judged on how they responded to the priorities of development. There was an immediate shift in the status of the churches. Due to its perceived closeness to the previous white regime, the Anglican Church lost influence relative to the Catholics, who became the de facto establishment church. Another early casualty was Zimbabwe Christian Council, formerly the RCC, which was forced to replace its General Secretary C.D. Watyoka with Rev. Murombedzi Kuchera. The impetus came from Reverend Canaan Banana, a Methodist Minister and active member of ZANU during the armed struggle, who was appointed Zimbabwe’s President. Banana sought to ensure that the church adhered to the state’s program of liberation, cajoling the ZCC to give greater attention towards development. Taken aback by state intervention into its governance and overwhelmed by new demands placed upon it, the ZCC made a muted response to the state-led violence in Matabeleland (1983-87) when Prime Minister Robert Mugabe dispatched his North Korean trained 5th Brigade into Matabeleland and the Midlands. Mugabe’s intervention followed the failed integration of former guerrilla forces associated with the rival nationalist party, ZAPU, and led to an estimated 20,000 casualties. The Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops Conference (ZCBC) were more outspoken, but their subsequent approach of quiet diplomacy caused a rift with the more radical CJP which published a dossier on the state’s atrocities, Breaking the Silence (1997).

Jealous of its authority and nervous of challenges to its power, the ruling party censored those who did not share its collective ideals. African independent churches (AICs) were regularly disparaged in the state-run and Catholic press for their rejection of schooling and biomedicine. The regime also pursued Right-Wing Revival Groups associated with American missionary activity which challenged the regime’s socialist ideology via their connections with apartheid South Africa and the promotion of a pro-capitalist prosperity gospel. Until the late 1990s the Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe (EFZ) followed a sectarian path, avoiding politics and deeply suspicious of the idea of ecumenism. EFZ’s first foray into politics in 1999 was a campaign for Zimbabwe to be declared a Christian Nation, stoking fears of Islamic dominance. It was successfully opposed by a coalition of conservative and liberal Catholics, and practitioners of traditional religion.

During the late 1990s the ruling party lost popularity, when under the pressure of neo-liberal Structural Adjustment Programs, it was no longer able to deliver on development. To boost its authority, it sided with war veterans, turning a blind eye to their illegal occupation of mostly white commercial farms. When it attempted to re-write the constitution in a more authoritarian manner it was opposed by a combination of labor, civics and the churches, out of which emerged a new opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Between 2000-2008 there ensued a period known as ‘the Crisis’. Extreme political violence, especially during elections, was accompanied by hyperinflation, deindustrialization and mass poverty. Zimbabwean nationalism became more nativistic, vilifying those who did not belong to the nation: whites, MDC supporters, Malawian labor migrants and homosexuals. The regime became increasingly antagonistic towards liberal democracy which it dismissed as westernization and neo-colonialism.

Although increasingly prone to violence, ZANU/PF still sought religious legitimacy, actively cultivating Christian regime enablers. Prominent church leaders such as Andrew Wutuwanashe and Nehemiah Mutendi have pursued Christians who oppose the regime and deployed Christian ideas to deify Robert Mugabe and his successor, Emmerson Mnangagwa in return for state patronage. There has also been a realignment between AICs and ZANU/PF, both movements sharing a nativism that prioritizes African rights to land. In 2010 the government formalized this new alliance by creating the Apostolic Christian Council of Zimbabwe (ACCZ). The regime uses the ACCZ and its more recent creation, the Zimbabwe Indigenous Interdenominational Council of Churches (ZIICC) (2019) to challenge the increasingly united front of church councils, and to advance state theology.

Between 2000 and 2008 the church councils, the ZCC, ZCBC and EFZ became more unified and outspoken, issuing The Zimbabwe We Want (2006). Working in concert with grassroots networks of ecumenical groups such as the Zimbabwe Christian Alliance (ZCA), they created a momentum that led to the creation of the Government of National Unity in 2009.

Although the ecumenical consensus of the period 2005-2008 soon evaporated, the Zimbabwe We Want document did become a foundational text for revisioning the nation, which continues to be consulted. The ZCA campaign influenced the churches to assume a more prophetic role on issues of social justice. But in response, the state ratcheted up its attacks. Church leaders have been on the receiving end of arbitrary arrests, death threats, and vilification in the state-run media, their meetings disrupted by the

Certainly, the prospects for a culture of reciprocal commitment to respecting and protecting the other at the level of church-state relations are bleak in a context where the Zimbabwean State seeks to dominate and divide the church. Equally significant is the state’s willingness to deploy its vast resources for the purpose of “othering” its enemies through xenophobia, homophobia, and nativism. The craven desire of some church leaders to enable the regime in return for resources and recognition is also striking.

The hope for a more covenantally pluralist future therefore lies not primarily in top-down dialogues but rather grassroots ecumenism—local ecumenical collaborations that are home-grown, spontaneous, and related to other social and cultural movements. It was this kind of activity seen in the local hubs of the ZCA that mobilized different churches across communities. These signs of covenantal pluralism occurred during Zimbabwe’s greatest moment of crisis, and in such moments, Christians are most likely to cast aside parochial theology and rhetoric to join forces with neighbors across religious divides.